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The	proposed	reform	of	the	European	Stability
Mechanism	must	be	postponed
Eurozone	finance	ministers	reached	a	preliminary	agreement	on	a	reform	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	in
June,	but	failed	to	conclude	it	last	week.	The	reform	is	now	set	to	be	discussed	during	the	European	Council
meeting	on	12-13	December.	Shahin	Vallée,	Jérémie	Cohen-Setton,	Paul	De	Grauwe	and	Sebastian	Dullien
write	that	the	proposal	should	not	be	endorsed	in	its	current	form.	They	argue	it	would	represent	a	missed
opportunity	to	secure	a	broader	and	more	ambitious	reform	package.
At	the	December	European	Council,	EU	leaders	will	be	asked	to	endorse	a	reform	of	the	European	Stability
Mechanism	(ESM).	They	should	refuse	to	do	so.	Closing	the	ESM	negotiations	now	would	remove	an	important
element	from	a	better	potential	reform	package.	Indeed,	the	reform	is	highly	imperfect	and	imbalanced,	and	the
issue	of	euro	area	reform	deserves	a	broader	and	more	ambitious	agenda.
The	ESM	reform	has	been	under	negotiation	for	three	years	and	has	had	three	important	objectives.	First,	it	aims	to
bring	the	ESM	under	community	law	so	as	to	reform	its	governance,	reduce	the	scope	for	potential	vetoes	by
national	governments,	and	increase	the	accountability	of	its	decision-making	in	relation	to	the	European	Parliament.
Second,	it	is	intended	to	enhance	the	ability	of	the	ESM	to	act	pre-emptively	and	safeguard	financial	stability
through	precautionary	instruments,	improve	the	functioning	of	the	ESM	in	programmes,	and	clarify	the	framework
for	debt	sustainability.	Finally,	it	seeks	to	expand	the	role	of	the	ESM	so	that	it	can	play	the	role	of	a	backstop	to	the
single	resolution	fund	(SRF).
European	finance	ministers	agreed	to	a	compromise	in	June	this	year	and	while	they	didn’t	conclude	this
agreement	last	week,	they	are	aiming	to	finalise	the	remaining	details	in	the	coming	months,	unless	the	European
Council	mandates	them	to	take	a	step	back.	Yet	the	reform	agreed	by	the	Eurogroup	falls	far	short	of	the	initial
objectives	and	risks	undermining	a	future	possible	deal.
Three	key	problems
The	first	issue	with	the	reform	is	that	the	ESM	would	remain	an	intergovernmental	organisation	rather	than	one	that
has	been	transformed	into	a	European	institution	or	body.	Its	governance	would	remain	dominated	by	national
vetoes,	its	decisions	would	remain	unaccountable	to	the	European	Parliament,	and	its	powers	would	eat	into	those
of	the	European	Commission	under	a	memorandum	of	cooperation	that	expands	the	monitoring	and	surveillance
role	of	the	ESM	without	increasing	its	accountability.	The	fact	that	memorandums	of	understanding	will	need	to	be
signed	by	the	ESM	not	only	fails	to	improve	its	governance	but	actually	makes	the	situation	worse	by	transferring
important	authority	to	the	ESM	without	appropriate	accountability.
Second,	the	ability	of	the	ESM	to	play	a	greater	stabilising	role	thanks	to	the	creation	of	a	precautionary	conditioned
credit	line	(PCCL)	has	been	undermined	by	a	series	of	criteria	that	make	it	inaccessible	to	most	countries.	For
instance,	even	today,	France	and	Finland	would	not	be	eligible.	In	practice,	there	is	thus	no	progress	regarding	the
stabilisation	capacity	of	the	ESM.	Together	with	the	reform	of	the	Collective	Action	Clauses	and	the	enhancement
of	the	ESM’s	role	in	debt	restructuring,	these	changes	would	most	likely	have	a	destabilising	rather	than	stabilising
effect	in	the	absence	of	progress	on	the	creation	of	a	safe	asset.
Finally,	the	agreement	to	use	the	ESM	as	a	backstop	to	the	single	resolution	fund	is	perceived	as	great	progress.
But	it	would	remain	subject	to	national	parliamentary	vetoes.	As	illustrated	by	recent	experience	and	highlighted	by
the	German	‘non-paper’	on	the	banking	union,	the	Single	Resolution	Board	is	actually	unable	to	undertake	the
resolution	of	even	a	small	bank	in	Europe	in	part	because	national	insolvency	will	always	be	preferred.	Therefore,	it
seems	hard	to	envisage	that	the	SRF	and	its	backstop	could	be	used	until	a	proper	resolution	framework
underpinned	by	a	genuine	European	insolvency	regime	emerges.	The	ESM	backstop	is	therefore	a	paper	tiger	and
even	potentially	a	step	backwards	from	the	current	ESM	direct	bank	recapitalisation	instrument.
Because	of	these	shortcomings,	there	should	therefore	be	no	qualms	about	delaying	an	agreement	on	the	ESM.	In
fact,	an	agreement	now	would	make	progress	more	difficult	in	other	critical	areas	of	the	euro	area	architecture.
Given	the	new	leadership	of	the	European	Commission,	and	the	change	of	attitude	in	Berlin	towards	banking	union,
agreeing	to	the	ESM	reform	as	it	stands	would	be	a	missed	opportunity	for	a	broader	and	more	ambitious	package.
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EU	leaders	must	take	a	moment	to	pause,	step	back	and	design	a	more	comprehensive	and	ambitious	euro	area
reform	agenda.	This	should	build	on:	the	reform	of	the	ESM,	the	reform	of	the	fiscal	compact	(TSCG),	progress	on
resolution	in	the	banking	union,	and	progress	on	the	Budgetary	Instrument	for	Convergence	and	Competitiveness
(BICC)	and	unemployment	insurance.
Bringing	the	ESM	under	community	law
The	ESM	reform	itself	must	be	modified	in	several	ways.	First,	the	memorandum	of	cooperation	agreed	with	the
European	Commission	goes	a	step	too	far	in	expanding	the	powers	of	the	ESM.	It	needs	to	be	revised	so	as	to
ensure	the	ESM’s	goals	are	more	narrowly	defined	and	embedded	into	the	European	institutional	framework	either
as	an	EU	agency	(the	embryo	of	a	European	Treasury)	or	as	a	body	with	its	own	capital	like	the	European
Investment	Bank.	Over	time,	this	would	reduce	the	role	and	potential	vetoes	of	national	governments	along	the	lines
of	the	European	Financial	Stabilisation	Mechanism	or	the	Balance	of	Payments	Assistance	Facility,	which	are	both
institutionally	and	democratically	much	more	robust	facilities.
It	is	vital	to	provide	genuine	precautionary	lending	instruments.	The	ESM	should	have	a	true	precautionary	line	that
could	be	activated	at	its	discretion	rather	than	only	in	the	context	of	narrowly	defined	eligibility	criteria.	The
Enhanced	Conditions	Credit	Line	(ECCL)	should	be	expanded	and	the	ways	in	which	it	would	differ	from	a	standard
ESM	loan	programme	should	be	clarified.
It	is	also	necessary	to	establish	a	backstop	to	the	resolution	framework.	The	use	of	the	ESM	as	a	backstop	to	the
single	resolution	fund	should	not	be	subject	to	national	vetoes.	As	the	recent	German	‘non-paper’	on	the	banking
union	highlights,	the	current	reform	proposal	would	only	make	the	backstop	effective	after	considerable	reforms	of
both	the	Banking	Recovery	and	Resolution	Directive	(BRRD)	as	well	as	reforms	of	the	Single	Resolution	Board.
Without	progress	on	the	banking	union,	the	promise	of	a	backstop	lodged	in	the	ESM	is	an	empty	one	because	it	is
certain	not	to	be	activated.	Therefore,	an	ambitious	ESM	reform	requires	ambitious	steps	to	also	upgrade	the
European	bank	resolution	framework.
Progress	on	the	banking	union
The	German	‘non-paper’	on	the	banking	union	has	highlighted	profound	weaknesses	in	the	resolution	framework.
Over	the	last	couple	of	years,	attention	has	focused	on	the	European	deposit	insurance	scheme,	but	deep	flaws	in
the	resolution	framework	have	been	ignored.	A	review	of	the	Banking	Recovery	and	Resolution	Directive	as	well	as
changes	to	the	Single	Resolution	Regulation	could	correct	many	flaws.	However,	a	real	harmonisation	of	bank
insolvency	procedures	and	legislation	might	be	necessary.	The	European	deposit	insurance	scheme	could	progress
more	rapidly	on	this	basis	and	be	more	fully	embedded	into	a	resolution	authority.	This	would	have	to	be
accompanied	by	clarifications	related	to	the	treatment	of	home/host	supervisory	issues	and	harmonisation	of	the	tax
framework	affecting	banks’	location	choices.
Establishing	the	embryo	of	a	genuine	fiscal	capacity
The	Budgetary	Instrument	for	Convergence	and	Competitiveness	falls	far	short	of	the	sort	of	instrument	the	euro
area	requires.	In	its	current	form,	it	fails	to	provide	the	kind	of	fiscal	stabilisation	the	euro	area	needs	as	it	was
designed	mostly	as	a	competitiveness	and	convergence	instrument.	For	it	to	be	enhanced	over	time	(under	an
inter-governmental	agreement	establishing	the	possibility	to	increase	its	resources	if	and	when	needed),	the	idea	of
juste	retour	and	its	exclusive	funding	via	the	EU	budget	must	be	abandoned.
Fiscal	stabilisation	could	also	be	complemented	through	the	creation	of	a	European	unemployment	insurance
scheme.	Leaders	must	also	(belatedly)	fulfil	a	promise	made	in	the	Meseberg	declaration	to	“set	up	[the]	working
group	with	a	view	to	making	concrete	proposals	by	the	European	Council	of	December	2018”	and	the	European
Commission	should	follow	up	with	a	legislative	proposal.
Reforming	fiscal	rules
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In	2011,	the	fiscal	compact	(TSCG)	was	designed	as	a	quid	pro	quo	for	the	creation	of	the	EFSF/ESM.	It	was	then
understood	that	after	having	been	created	under	the	urgency	of	the	financial	crisis,	the	ESM	and	the	fiscal	compact
would	be	brought	together	under	community	law.	This	commitment	was,	in	fact,	enshrined	in	the	TSCG	itself.	The
European	Fiscal	Board	has	advocated	a	reformed	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	which	would	be	based	on	one	single
target	(sustainable	public	debt),	one	single	instrument	(controlling	net	expenditure	growth)	and	one	general	escape
clause.
The	push	for	more	green	investments	also	requires	an	updating	of	the	current	framework,	which	should	include	the
possibility	of	financing	these	investments	through	larger	deficits	and	bond	issuance.	President	Macron	has
suggested	in	a	recent	interview	that	fiscal	rules	are	outdated	but	has	yet	to	propose	a	new	and	more	effective	fiscal
framework.	The	European	Commission	will	not	escape	a	review	of	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	during	its	term.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	European	Central	Bank	/	Martin	Lamberts	(CC	BY-NC-ND
2.0)
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